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Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 
('the Act'), which contains the UK's 
primary statutory prohibition against 
insider dealing, replaced, reorganised and 
in some respects, expanded previous 
criminal insider dealing legislation. The 
provisions of the Act overlap both the 
Financial Services Act 1986 (FSA) and the 
rules of sell-regulating organisations 
(SROs). The Securities and Investments 
Board's (SIB) principles apply to the SROs 
and its rules have the force of law: Rule 2 8 
prohibits knowingly effecting a transaction 
which contravenes the statutory 
restrictions. Under FSA s. 61 the SIB can 
take action against breaches of its own 
rules or those of SROs. Under the current 
scheme, SIB is an axis between civil, 
regulatory and criminal remedies.
THE 1993 ACT
Section 52 of the Act establishes three 
broad types of offences: dealing, disclosing 
and encouraging. The new general offence 
of 'encouraging' applies where there is 
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe 
that the object of encouragement would be 
likely to deal, even if he does not deal and 
regardless of his knowledge, either that the 
information comes from an insider or may 
be price sensitive. Thus, the offence 
focuses upon the mind of the insider.
The 1993 Act's definition of inside 
information includes material price- 
sensitive information relating to a specific 
sector, as well as to an issuer of specific 
securities. Section 60(4) catches any 
information affecting a company's 
'business prospects'. It is apparent, 
therefore, that a decision to make a take-
Susan Scott Hunt
over bid for securities of a particular 
company is capable of being inside 
information in regard to securities of both 
the target company and those in the sector 
within which it operates.
The 1993 Act came into effect in March 
1994. Within only a few months, in August 
1994, two innovative take-over 
transactions were begun by two corporate 
clients of the same integrated banking, 
broking and marketing operation. In both 
cases, the targets were recendy privatised 
regional electricity companies (RECs). 
Neither transaction resulted in any 
criminal investigation for insider trading by 
the Serious Fraud Office or any other 
agency. Nor, in relation to either 
transaction, was criminal liability found to 
have existed. However, the transactions 
produced a surprising crop of issues 
involving interpretation of the expanded 
provisions of the Act and fuelled long- 
standing criticism of the fragmentary 
character of the regulatory and 
enforcement structures (now to be 
replaced by the recently christened 
Financial Services Authority', a unified 
regulatory body under SIB leadership).
THE SBC CASE
At the end of last August, in disciplinary 
proceedings instituted a year earlier, the 
Securities and Futures Authority (SFA), an 
SRO, 'severely reprimanded' the Swiss 
Bank Corporation (SBC) for breaching 
'Chinese walls' in connection with one deal 
and a technical breach in respect of the 
other. Both involved the innovative use of 
contracts for differences (or cash 
performance notes). One potential 
application of such contracts is to provide 
cost coverage in a bid situation, enabling 
the client to benefit from an uplift in the 
underlying shares. The contracts at issue 
were custom-made off-exchange hedging 
mechanisms. The 1993 Act catches 
contracts for differences linked to shares or 
debt where the underlying securities areJ o
dealt with on a regulated market. It also 
extends to off- market dealings by or in 
reliance upon a professional intermediary 
(s. 54 and Sch. 2).
In a Board Notice (438) issued on 28 
August 1997, the SFA announced it was
fining SBC £300,000 plus costs.
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Combined with a fine in respect of 
unrelated misconduct, it totalled nearly 
half a million pounds, a record broken only 
by a 1995 line against Morgan Stanley in a 
case invoking a rogue trader. Was this a late 
brandishment by die SFA of its regulatory 
muscle - just before it is swallowed whole 
by the recently christened Financial 
Services Authority? What was the SFA's 
view in respect of the second bid 
transaction? Did either deal impact the 
other in a manner relevant to the 
likelihood of 'encouragement' occurring?
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PROCEDURES CRITICISED
The SFA said SBC was being fined 'because 
Chinese wall procedures were not properly 
implemented, monitored pr controlled'. The 
compliance department was an inappropriate 
intermediary. Necessary individuals should 
have been brought over the Chinese walls, 
which were, in any event, erected too late. 
Records of the entire procedure were 
inadequate.
AFTER THE EVENT
The events which culminated in the fine 
had all occurred more than three years 
earlier. In August 1994 an SBC corporate 
client formally notified SBC's corporate 
finance arm that it would consider making 
a bid for Yorkshire Electric ('Yorkshire'). A 
quote on the price of Yorkshire securities 
was sought for the purpose of entering into 
a contract for differences, with the bank 
acting as the counterparty. It was SBC's 
compliance department, charged with 
enforcing City rules, which acted as 
intermediary in approaching SBC's market 
makers for an indicative price. At this stage 
the intermediary was ignorant of the 
counterparty's identity and intentions. 
However, it is clear that Chinese walls, 
designed to prevent the unnecessary 
transfer of information within a group 
(thereby reducing conflicts of interest), 
were not implemented before the first 
contracts were made.
The procedures call for the 
intermediary to be brought over the 
Chinese wall in appropriate circumstances. 
In the next few days, six contracts pegged 
to Yorkshire and representing 3% of issued 
share capital were entered into. SBC's
market makers then rapidly acquired 
Yorkshire shares. Indeed, by the end of 
December, SBC held 8.2%, 3.7% of which 
was in excess of what was required to off- 
set the bank's exposure under the 
contracts. Did the market makers guess or 
read the smoke signals about the corporate 
client's bid? Had SBC's corporate finance 
arm 'encouraged' their trading?
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CHINESE WALLS
The SFA said SBC was being fined:
'... because Chinese wall procedures were not 
properly implemented, monitored or controlled'.
The compliance department was an 
inappropriate intermediary. Necessary 
individuals should have been brought over 
the Chinese walls which were, in any event, 
erected too late. Records of the entire 
procedure were inadequate. (Violations of 
SIB principles 3 and 9 were acknowledged. 
The former requires observance of high 
standards of market conduct, the latter, 
organisation and control of internal 
affairs.) The SFA's final finding was that the 
bank failed sufficiently to probe its market 
makers for an independently justifiable 
basis of confidence in the RECs (market 
makers acting in good faith are protected 
by the Act where they take a position in the 
market which is reasonable independently 
from the information. (Sch. 1).)
In fact, by the end of 1994, not only 
were the market makers holding a long 
position in Yorkshire, but SBC had 
increased holdings across the sector. The 
SFA Board Notice adds the following 
detail: directlv after the client's notification 
of interest in Yorkshire, SBC's compliance 
department also canvassed the market 
makers on their willingness to become 
registered in respect of further RECs' 
securities. Further, in reality, the situation 
was more complicated: the Yorkshire bid 
was only one of two themes, the 
counterpoise to which involved a near- 
simultaneous bid for another REC, 
Northern Electric. The SFA's Board Notice 
contains but a brief paragraph about SBC's 
second adventure with the RECs, noting 
that during this same period SBC, having 
inside information in relation to a second 
corporate client's interest in Northern 
Electric, also entered into (and, 
presumably hedged) a separate package of 
contracts for differences.
Nonetheless, the SFA's view seems to 
have been that a relatively straightforward 
transgression of Chinese walls took place in 
the (eventually aborted) bid for Yorkshire. 
The regulator accepted that SBC acted in
good faith. The record fine may, 
superficially, have sent a stern signal, but 
will barely irritate, let alone sting. Perhaps 
the SFA appreciated that, whichever way it 
was done, SBC's market makers would 
have been alerted. To attempt to restrain 
them would only have confirmed their 
deductions. In this respect, the SFA 
solution may be viewed as a proportionate 
response, balancing interests in market 
innovation and protecting confidence in 
the integrity of the market.
NORTHERN ELECTRIC
In the Northern Electric bid situation, 
there was no intermediary. SBC's 
corporate finance arm passed the contracts 
directly to SBC's London market makers 
without comment. Again, under cover of 
their exemption from the normal 
requirement that all stakes in listed 
companies over 3% be disclosed, the 
market makers increased their ownership 
in the affected utilities - not only the bid 
target, but the other RECs, amongst whom
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numbered Yorkshire. Between the end of 
November and mid-December, when 
referral to the Eondon Stock Exchange 
forced a declaration of intention to bid, 
Northern shares shot up.
Yet SBC circumnavigated the self-
o
regulatory net; it was cleared of 
misconduct by four separate investigations 
into the bid for Northern. There was 
confusion about the overlapping 
jurisdictions of SROs, with regulators 
avoiding or delaying action because of 
pending probes of others. As in the bid for 
Yorkshire, a key issue was whether the 
actions of SBC's corporate finance arm 
'encouraged' the market makers to buy 
REC shares. Before the bid, the Takeover 
Panel executive (whose rules mirror the 
previous insider dealing legislation) 
specifically reviewed the likelihood of the 
market makers' actual reaction. Arguably it 
was more than foreseeable, yet all the 
regulators conceded the scheme fell 
outside the regulatory structure. In respect 
of the bid for the second REC, the SFA 
found one mere technical breach of 
Chinese walls, the absence of an 
intermediary having, perhaps rightly, made 
the difference. In no respect, however, was 
the wider context, specifically the 
possibility of the two bids compounding 
the foreseeability of SBC's trading, 
reviewed.
At the time, institutional shareholders 
were incensed by SBC's non-disclosure of 
its REC stakes. It was argued that the City's 
reputation was injured by what was seen as
a misuse of market makers' privileges (a 
claim which SBC dismissed as competitive 
envy of its innovative approach). 
Disclosure rules of large stakes built up as 
part of market making operations have 
since been tightened. The SIB has 
outlawed undisclosed derivative contracts 
in take-over bids. It is at least a satisfactory 
outcome that the situation is not likely to 
be repeated.
PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE 
REGULATION
On the road to 'Super-SIB' what 
wisdom is to gleaned from the wreckage 
(or 'REC-age') of SBC's adventures and 
what some saw as the disarray and timidity 
of City regulators? The integrated new 
authority' will combine nine organisations, 
including the SROs. An outline published
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at its launch shows plans for a brisk-paced 
transitional phase, indicates its direction 
and promises a dedicated investigative, 
enforcement and disciplinary unit, 
handling cases across all firms and markets 
and providing a 'platform for a consistent 
approach'.
TARNISHED IMAGE
At the time, institutional shareholders were 
incensed by SBC's non-disclosure of its REC 
stakes. It was argued that the City's
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reputation was injured by what was seen as a 
misuse of market makers' privileges (a claim 
which SBC dismissed as competitive envy of 
its innovative approach). Disclosure rules of 
large stakes built up as part of market making 
operations have since been tightened.
The SIB will be required to convert itself 
into a comprehensive, vigorous 
enforcement organisation exercising 
authority within the blunt boundaries of 
commercial law, while maintaining the 
flexible governance function available to 
the current second tier SROs. The balance 
will not be achieved through the mere
o
absorption of the SROs. It will require 
both adequate resources and a willingness 
to move towards a pragmatic enforcement 
philosophy, an appropriate element of 
which may be expanded civil 
remedies. @
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